Labor Economics Pierre Cahuc
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Contents
Preface xv
Introduction xvii
Acknowledgments xxxiii
PART ONE Labor Supply and Demand Behaviors 1
CHAPTER 1 , Labor Supply 3
1 Facts About Labor Supply 5
1.1 Basic Definitions 5
1.2 The Trend in the Amount of Time Worked 5
1.3 The Evolution of Participation Rates 7
1.4 Part-Time Work by Women 10
1.5 Leisure and Home Production 11
2 The Neoclassical Theory of Labor Supply 13
2.1 The Choice Between Consumption and Leisure 13
2.2 Labor Supply with Household Production and
Within the Family . 23
2.3 Life Cycle and Retirement 28
3 Empirical Aspects of Labor Supply 38
3.1 Estimation of the Structural Parameters of
Labor Supply Models 39
3.2 Main Results in the Literature . 50
4 Summary and Conclusion 58
5 Related Topics in the Book 59
6 Further Readings 59
7 Appendices 60
7.1 Properties of Indifference Curves 60
7.2 The Properties of the Labor Supply Function 60
7.3 Compensated and Noncompensated Elasticity 61
7.4 Frischian, Hicksian, and Marshallian Elasticities
of Labor Supply 62
7.5 Sample Selection 68
CHAPTER 2 v Labor Demand 77
1 The Static Theory of Labor Demand 81
1.1 Labor Demand in the Short Run 81
1.2 The Substitution of Capital for Labor 83
1.3 Scale Effects 90
1.4 Beyond Two Inputs 95
1.5 The Trade-off Between Workers and Homs 101
2 From Theory to Estimate 113
2.1 Specific Functional Forms for Factor Demands 113
2.2 Main Issues and Main Results 116
3 Dynamic Labor Demand 118
3.1 The Costs of Labor Adjustment 119
3.2 The Adjustment of Employment in a
Deterministic Environment 122
3.3 The Adjustment of Labor Demand in a Stochastic
Environment 128
3.4 Empirical Aspects of Labor Demand in the
Presence of Adjustment Costs 135
4 Summary and Conclusion 138
5 Related Topics in the Book 139
6 Further Readings 140
7 Appendices 140
7.1 The Convexity of Isoquants 140
7.2 The Properties of Cost Functions 141
7.3 The Optimal Value of Hours Worked 144
CHAPTER 3 Competitive Equilibrium and Compensating
Wage Differentials 151
1 The Competitive Equilibrium 153
1.1 Perfect Competition with Identical Workers and .
Jobs of Equal Difficulty 153
1.2 The Question of Tax Incidence 156
1.3 The Effect of a Shock on Labor Supply 159
1.4 Other Evidence on the Impact of Massive Shocks 169
2 Compensating Wage Differentials and the Hedonic
Theory of Wages 169
2.1 A Simple Model of Compensating Wage
Differentials 170
2.2 Does the Hedonic Theory of Wages Really Apply? 174
3 Assortative Matching 180
3.1 A Competitive Equilibrium with Assignment 181
3.2 An Illustration: The Upswing in CEO
Remuneration 184
4 Summary and Conclusion 187
5 Related Topics in the Book 187
6 Further Readings 188
CHAPTER 4 Education and Human Capital 191
1 Some Facts 192
1.1 Spending on Education 192
1.2 Graduation Rates 194
1.3 Education and Performance on the Labor Market 196
2 The Theory of Human Capital 198
2.1 The Relation Between Earnings and
Human Capital 199
2.2 Schooling and Wage Earnings 201
2.3 Education, Training, and Life-Cycle Earnings 204
3 Education as a Signaling Device 208
3.1 A Model with Signaling 209
3.2 Overeducation or Undereducation? 212
4 Identifying the Causal Relation Between Education
and Income 214
4.1 The Theory of Human Capital:
From the Model to Estimates , 215
4.2 The Selection Problem 218
5 The Returns to Education 230
5.1 Private Returns to Education 230
5.2 Private Nonpecuniary Returns to Education 236
5.3 Social Returns to Education 236
5.4 What Is Really Important in Education? 239
6 Summary and Conclusion ' 245
7 Related Topics in the Book 246
8 Further Readings 246
PART TWO Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets 251
CHAPTER 5 Job Search 253
1 What Do Job Seekers Do? 255
1.1 How Job Seekers Spend Their Time 256
1.2 How Economic Incentives Affect the Time
Dedicated to Job Search 257
1.3 Methods of Job Search: An Internet Revolution? 258
2 Basic Job Search Theory 260
2.1 The Basic Model 260
2.2 Extensions of the Basic Model 269
3 Empirical Aspects of Job Search 280
3.1 The Identification Strategy 281
3.2 Estimation 284
3.3 Main Results on the Determinants of
Unemployment Duration 295
4 Search Frictions and Wage Differentials 300
4.1 Empirical Facts About Wage Differentials 300
4.2 The Equilibrium Search Model 303
5 Summary and Conclusion 316
6 Related Topics in the Book 317
7 Further Readings 317
CHAPTER 6 Contracts, Risk-Sharing, and Incentive 325
1 The Labor Contract 327
1.1 Explicit and Implicit Clauses 327
1.2 Complete and Incomplete Contracts 328
1.3 The Agency Model 329
2 Risk-Sharing 329
2.1 Symmetric or Verifiable Information 331
2.2 Asymmetric or Unverifiable Information 337
3 Incentive in the Presence of Verifiable Results 342
3.1 The Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Action 343
3.2 Should Remuneration Always Be Individualized? 349
3.3 Some Reasons That Performance Pay May Be
Inefficient 351
4 Incentive in the Absence of Verifiable Results 355
4.1 Promotions and Tournaments 355
4.2 Seniority and Incentives _ 362
4.3 Efficiency Wage and Involuntary Unemployment 371
5 Social Preferences 377
5.1 Gift Exchange, Reciprocity 377
5.2 Intrinsic Motivation and Reputation 383
6 Summary and Conclusion ' 0 389 '
7 Related Topics in the Book 390
8 Further Readings 390
9 Appendix: The Properties of the Net Reputational
Payoff Function 391
CHAPTER 7 ■ Collective Bargaining and Labor Unions 401
1 Facts About Unions and Collective Bargaining 403
1.1 The Characteristics and Importance of Collective
Agreements 403
1.2 The Determinants of Union Density 409
2 Bargaining Theory 413
2.1 The Precursors 413
2.2 The Axiomatic Approach 415
2.3 The Strategic Approach 416
2.4 Labor Conflicts: Strikes and Arbitration 423
3 Models of Collective Bargaining for Wages, Employment, and Investment
3.1 The Objective of Labor Unions
3.2 Models of Collective Bargaining
3.3 Negotiations and Investment
4 Empirical Evidence Regarding the Consequences of Collective Bargaining
4.1 The Estimation of the Union Wage Gap by Ordinary Least Squares
4.2 Regression Discontinuity
4.3 Wage Inequalities
4.4 Employment
4.5 Productivity and Profits
4.6 Investment and Capital Structure
5 Summary and Conclusion
6 Related Topics in the Book
7 Further Readings
8 Appendices
8.1 Unicity of Solution (x*,y*)
8.2 The Correspondence Between the Nash Axiomatic Solution and the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Rubinstein’s Model
CHAPTER 8 . Discrimination ^
1 Some Facts About Wage and Employment Differences 481
1.1 Women Versus Men 481
1.2 Gaps Between Ethnic Groups 483
2 Theories of Discrimination 488
2.1 Taste Discrimination 488
2.2 Statistical Discrimination 491
3 Measuring Wage Discrimination 495
3.1 Estimations of Wage Equations: The Case of the
Black-White Wage Gap 496
3.2 Decomposition Methods: The Case of the Gender
Wage Gap 504
3.3 Direct Assessment of Discrimination 514
4 Empirical Results Regarding Discrimination 520
4.1 Race- and Ethnicity-Related Discrimination 520
4.2 Gender Discrimination 524
4.3 Sexual Orientation and Discrimination 528
4.4 The Premium for Beauty 532
5 How to Reduce Inequality Among Demographic Groups 534
5.1 Affirmative Action 535
5.2 The Importance of Premarket Factors 537
6 Summary and Conclusion 541
7 Related Topics in the Book 542
8 Further Readings 543
PART THREE Job Creation, Job Destruction, and Unemployment 551
CHAPTER 9 Equilibrium Unemployment 553
1 Facts 555
1.1 Unemployment, Employment, and Participation 555
1.2 Jobs Flows 563
1.3 Worker Flows 567
2 The Competitive Model with Labor Adjustment Costs 578
2.1 Job Reallocation and Labor Market Equilibrium 578
2.2 The Efficiency of the Competitive Equilibrium 581
2.3 The Limitations of the Competitive Model 582
3 The Matching Model 583
3.1 The Matching Function and the Beveridge Curve 583
3.2 The Behavior of Firms and Workers 589
3.3 Wage Bargaining 592
3.4 Labor Market Equilibrium 596
4 The Efficiency of Market Equilibrium 600
. 4.1 Trading Externalities 600
4.2 The Social Optimum 601
4.3 Is Labor Market Equilibrium Necessarily
Inefficient? 603
5 Investment and Employment 606
5.1 The Investment Decision 607
5.2 Wage Bargaining 609
5.3 The Adjustment Lag of Capital 610
6 Unemployment Fluctuations 610
6.1 The Dynamics of the Vacancies and
Unemployment 610
6.2 The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle 613
7 Summary' and Conclusion 620
8 Related Topics in the Book 621
9 Further Readings 621
CHAPTER 10 Technological Progress, Unemployment, and
Inequality 527
1 Technological Progress and Unemployment 628
1.1 Facts About Technological Progress, Labor
Productivity, and Unemployment 629
1.2 The Capitalization Effect 633
1.3 Creative Destruction 638
2 Technological Progress and Inequality 646
2.1 Facts on Wages and Occupations 647
2.2 A Model with Skills and Tasks 649
2.3 What Empirical Research Tells Us ■ 657
2.4 The Role of Institutions 666
2.5 Endogenous Technological Progress 668
3 Summary and Conclusion 670
4 Related Topics in the Book 670
5 Further Readings 671
6 Appendices 671
6.1 The Relation Between в and g 671
6.2 Properties of the Assignment Model 672
CHAPTER 11 Globalization, Employment, and Inequality 677
1 International Trade and Labor Markets: Facts and
Theories 679
1.1 The Rise in the Volume of Trade and Its
Consequences 679
1.2 The Stolper and Samuelson Theorem 685
1.3 Firms’Selection and Trade 688
2 International Trade and Labor Markets: Empirical
Evidence 697
2.1 Empirical Evidence at the Macro Level 697
2.2 Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level 708
3 Migrations 714
3.1 The Characteristics of Migrations 714
3.2 Theory 722
3.3 Empirical Results 726
4 Summary and Conclusion 733
5 Related Topics in the Book 734
6 Further Readings 734
7 Appendix 734
PART FOUR Public Policies . 741
CHAPTER 12 Income Redistribution 743
1 Taxation and Transfers 745
1.1 The Main Features of Taxes in OECD Countries 745
1.2 The Effect of Taxes on the Labor Market 759
1.3 What Empirical Studies Tell Us 767
2 The Minimum Wage 786
2.1 A Constraint of Varying Strength from Country
to Country 787
2.2 Minimum Wage and Employment 793
